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Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on two-sided atomeless assign-
ment models of workers to tasks. Using simple parametric examples,
the fundamental diﬀerences between the comparative advantage and
the scale of operations models are illustrated. Holding the distribu-
tions of abilities and tasks and the production function of worker-task
pairs constant, the two principles are shown to produce diﬀerent wage
distributions and wage inequality. These models are useful to evaluate
the general equilibrium eﬀect of technical change on the wage struc-
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1 Introduction
Consider a labor market where workers are heterogenous with respect to their
ability. Similarly, tasks, that are owned by firms, are heterogenous with re-
spect to their diﬃculty. To produce output, tasks need to be performed by
workers. Two central questions arise in this market. First, which worker per-
forms what task? Second, what are the equilibrium payoﬀs? Two-sided atom-
eless assignment models answer these two questions simultaneously. These
models1 focus on the relationship between the distribution of abilities, the
distribution of tasks and the resulting equilibrium payoﬀs functions. This
relationship makes two-sided atomeless assignment models particularly at-
tractive to analyze the wage structure as a function of the distribution of
abilities. Moreover, while there are N ! diﬀerent possible assignments in an
economy with N workers and N tasks, the assignment that prevails in equi-
librium will depend on the production function of worker-task pairs. This
relationship makes two-sided atomeless assignment models particularly at-
tractive to analyze changes in the wage structure as technology evolves over
time.
This paper reviews the literature on two-sided atomeless assignment mod-
els of workers to tasks. Two groups of models can be distinguished according
to the principle that governs assignment, i.e. comparative advantage prin-
ciple or scale of operations principle. As Sattinger (1984, 1993) already
highlighted, both principles diﬀer in the location of flexibility in the econ-
omy. In the comparative advantage model, workers are perfect substitutes
but the output of tasks must be produced in fixed proportions. In the scale
of operations model, there is no substitution possibility between workers but
the output of tasks are perfect substitutes. In this paper, I propose to use
simple parametric examples to illustrate the fundamental diﬀerences between
the comparative advantage and the scale operations models. I will show that
both principles yield diﬀerent wage functions in equilibrium and this, even
1The assignment literature diverges from the matching theory, see Mortensen (1986) for
instance, and search theory, (see Jovanovic (1979), Diamond (1981) and Pissarides (1984))
by assuming that workers have full knowledge of all employers’ wage oﬀers and that em-
ployers have full knowledge of all workers’ abilities. In assignment models, it is assumed
that free choice and competitive markets assign tasks to workers eﬃciently. Perfect com-
petition ensures that workers are rewarded according to their marginal productivity. Free
choice ensures that workers are eﬃciently assigned to tasks. Recently, some attempts have
been made towards incorporating search frictions into assignment models, e.g. Sattinger
(1995), Burdett and Coles (1997), Shimer and Smith (2000) and Shimer (2003, 2005).
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when the distribution of abilities and tasks and the production technology are
identical. In particular, I will show that the two principles lead to diﬀerences
in wage inequality in equilibrium.
Assignment models are very useful to model the impact of technical
change on the wage distribution. The most common approach in the lit-
erature has been to consider changes in the production function parameters
over time. For instance, Teulings (1995) and Costrell and Loury (2004) have
shown, among other, that skilled-biased technical change captured by an in-
crease in the production function of worker-task pairs leads to an increase in
wage inequality. Yet, technical change could also operate through changes
in the distribution of tasks or machines over time. Although this last type
of technical change has been less studied in the literature, recent empirical
evidence about job polarization by Autor et al. (2006), Goos and Manning
(2007) and Spitz-Oener (2006) suggests it has empirical support. Technical
change captured by an increase in the mean task leads to an increase in the
wage of all workers but also an increase in wage inequality.
Closely related to the models discussed in this paper is the burgeoning lit-
erature about one-sided atomeless assignment models. In these models, there
is only one type of heterogenous agents2 and two types of assignment occur.
First, depending on their abilities, agents are assigned to be either a worker
or a manager. After this initial assignment, groups of workers are assigned
to managers. Equilibrium in these models is characterized by a mapping
function that maps ability to occupations, a mapping function that maps
teams of diﬀerent sizes, where size is measured in eﬃciency units (number
of workers × ability level) to managers of diﬀerent abilities and a monotonic
wage function so that the most able worker earns less than the least able
manager, there is no overlap between the earnings of workers and managers.
In equilibrium, managers of higher ability run larger firms. Among others,
Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and more recently Fox (2006) used these models
to explain the distribution of firms size, the eﬀect of firm-size on earnings
or the earnings of superstars as Rosen (1981). Garicano (2000), Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) and (2006) developed one-sided assignment mod-
els designed to explain changes in wages, hierarchical structure and firm-size
as communication costs decrease through technical change. In their model,
firm-size is not restricted to be expressed in eﬃciency units anymore. The
2Lucas (1978) considers two types of (inputs) agents: capital and workers. in Lucas’s
model, only workers are heterogenous though.
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model allows us to distinguish between the number and the ability level of
workers assigned to managers. They show that in equilibrium, abler man-
agers will supervise larger teams of higher ability.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides
some preliminary definitions. Section 3 presents the comparative advantage
model. Section 4 presents the scale of operations model. Section 5 compares
the wage distribution derived from both models. Section 6 focuses on the
impact of technical change on the distribution of wages in the various models.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Definitions
In the various models discussed in this paper, the supply side of the economy
is characterized by workers who are heterogenous with respect to a single car-
dinal one-dimensional measure. This measure matters for performing tasks,
jobs or operating machines. However, in the various papers surveyed this
measure has been given diﬀerent names. Sattinger (1975) refers to this mea-
sure as grades while Sattinger (1979, 1993) and Costrell and Loury (2004)
refer to ability and Teulings (1995, 2005) uses the term skills. In this paper,
I will use the term ability to define this supply side measure.
On the other side of these two-sided assignment models, demand is char-
acterized by a single cardinal one-dimensional measure. Just as workers’
characteristics, the demand side characteristic matters for productivity. Sat-
tinger (1975) refers to this demand side measure as tasks whereas Sattinger
(1979, 1993) refers to machines and Costrell and Loury (2004) and Teulings
(1995, 2005) use the term job. In this paper, I will use both the term task
and the term machine interchangeably to define this demand side measure.
The term task is generic to all models but in the diﬀerential rents model it
is preferable to talk about machines when we refer to the associated rents.
One may wrongly believe that the assignment of workers to tasks is al-
ways driven by the structure of comparative advantage. In fact, as Sattinger
(1984, 1993) already highlighted, there are two distinct principles governing
the assignment of workers to tasks in the literature besides comparative ad-
vantage. The first alternative to comparative advantage to determine the
assignment of workers to tasks is preferences. Tinbergen (1956) developed a
model in which the assignment of workers to jobs is driven by workers’ pref-
erences for performing certain tasks. Wage diﬀerentials in this model arise
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as compensating diﬀerentials rather than productivity diﬀerentials. Since
this paper focuses on the impact of technological change in assignment mod-
els, Tinbergen’s (1956) allocation model, which focuses on preferences rather
than technology, will not be treated in this paper.
Yet, the scale of operations model provides a third principle that may
govern the assignment of workers to tasks. As in the comparative advantage
model, in the scale of operations model, wage diﬀerentials arise from pro-
ductivity diﬀerences. However, the scale of operations and the comparative
advantage principles diﬀer essentially in the technology available to produce
output, although not necessarily in the production function of worker-task
pairs. While in the comparative advantage model, the output of each task is
required in fixed proportions, there is perfect substitution between the out-
put of each task in the scale of operations. Moreover, while a particular task
could be performed by an indefinite number of workers in the comparative
advantage model, workers are needed in fixed proportions at each task in
the scale of operations model. Hence, both models diﬀer in the location of
the flexibility in the economy. In the comparative advantage model, there
is perfect flexibility at the task level but aggregate output is produced with
fixed proportions of the output of each task, while in the scale of operations
eﬀect, aggregate output is produced with perfect substitutability of the out-
put at each task but the output at each task must be produced with fixed
proportions of workers.
3 Comparative advantage
3.1 Sattinger 1975
In his influential paper, Sattinger (1975) developed a model that describes
the assignment of workers with diﬀerent abilities to heterogenous tasks. He
showed that a suﬃcient condition for the wage distribution to be diﬀerent
from the distribution of productivity, is the presence of workers comparative
advantage in productivity. Frictions of any sorts are not necessary.
Formally, let t be a worker’s ability and let s(t) be the density distribution
of abilities in the economy. The economy is assumed to be large enough
so that s(t) is continuous on an interval. Similarly, let v be a task to be
performed in a single firm and let d(v) be the density distribution of tasks.
Tasks diﬀer in their diﬃculty and without loss of generality, assume that the
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diﬃculty of tasks increases with v.
Assume perfect information, so that firms know s(t) and workers know
d(v), and competition so that no single firm and no single worker can aﬀect
wages. Assume further that workers work the same amount of hours per
period and that tasks are divisible. Although firms choose which tasks they
want to have performed based on the costs of having them performed and
the production resulting from these tasks, in equilibrium, firms do not seek
to have a diﬀerent task performed. This means that, given the distribution
of tasks, we can infer the assignment of workers to tasks and hence the
distribution of wages.
To equilibrate demand and supply, each worker needs to be assigned to
a task and each task needs to be assigned a worker. Suppose there are N
workers and N tasks in this economy. This means that there are N ! pos-
sible assignments. Sattinger (1975) proved that if the density distribution
of ability and tasks are continuous and if workers with higher ability have a
comparative advantage in more diﬃcult tasks, then the equilibrium assign-
ment is the one for which workers with higher ability perform more diﬃcult
tasks, i.e. v = v(t) with v0(t) > 0.
Let c(v, t) be the time it takes a worker with ability t to perform task
v. The function r(v, t) = 1
c(v,t)
is by definition the productivity of a worker
with ability t at task v. Comparative advantage means that c is log sub-
modular, i.e. ∂
2 ln c(v,t)
∂v∂t
< 0 and therefore that r(v, t) is log supermodular, i.e.
∂2 ln r(v,t)
∂v∂t
> 0. Let w(t) be the wage of a worker with ability t. The costs of
having task v performed by worker with ability t is given by C = w(t)c(v, t).
Firms minimizing costs will therefore seek the level of ability t∗ so that:
w0(t∗)c(v, t∗) + w(t∗)
∂c(v, t∗)
∂t
= 0
⇔
−∂ ln c(v, t
∗)
∂t
=
∂ lnw(t∗)
∂t
(1)
To see why it is the structure of comparative advantage and not absolute
advantage that drives the assignment of more able workers to more complex
jobs, consider the second order condition to costs minimization. The first
order condition spelled out above will be costs minimizing if and only if costs
are convex or ∂
2C
∂t2
> 0. This reads as:
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∙
∂2 ln c(v, t)
∂t2
¸
v=v(t)
+
∂2 lnw(t)
∂t2
> 0
⇔
v0(t)
∙
∂2 ln c(v, t)
∂v∂t
¸
v=v(t)
< 0
since using the first order condition we have ∂
2 lnw(t)
∂t2
= −
h
∂2 ln c(v,t)
∂t2
i
v=v(t)
−
v0(t)
h
∂2 ln c(v,t)
∂v∂t
i
v=v(t)
.
Hence, as long as the costs function is log submodular
h
∂2 ln c(v,t)
∂v∂t
i
v=v(t)
<
0, i.e. as long as there is comparative advantage, more skilled workers with
be assigned to more complex tasks in equilibrium and v0 > 0.
Substituting v(t) for v in the first order condition 1 and integrating over
a range of ability, we obtain the fundamental equation that links wage dif-
ferentials ∂ lnw(t
∗)
∂t
, and hence the distribution of wages, to the assignment of
workers to tasks defined by v(t).
Z t2
t1
−
∙
∂ ln c(v, t∗)
∂t
¸
v=v(t)
dt =
Z t2
t1
∂ lnw(t∗) (2)
orZ t2
t1
∙
∂ ln r(v, t∗)
∂t
¸
v=v(t)
dt =
Z t2
t1
∂ lnw(t∗)
The wage diﬀerential between workers with abilities t1 and t2, with t2 > t1,
is larger than the productivity diﬀerential between the two workers holding
the task constant. Since v0(t) > 0, wage diﬀerentials in this model arise from
ability diﬀerentials, magnified by the assignment of abler workers to more
diﬃcult, hence more rewarded, tasks. The wage distribution will therefore
be skewed to the right compared to the distribution of productivity at any
given task. Integrating equation 2 over t yields the equilibrium (log) wage
function lnw(t). Since lnw(t) is monotonic, its inverse t(lnw) is well defined.
Performing the change of variables t(lnw) and noting that dt = t
0(lnw)dw
w
, the
density distribution of wages in equilibrium is derived as:
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l(w) =
s(t(lnw))t0(lnw)
w
Example 1. To illustrate this model, consider the following simple ex-
ample.3 Suppose r(v, t) = exp(δvt) with δ > 0. This functional form is log
supermodular hence, abler workers have a comparative advantage in diﬃ-
cult tasks. Therefore, in equilibrium, abler workers will be assigned to more
diﬃcult tasks. Suppose further that abilities and tasks follow uniform dis-
tributions, s(t) = 1
t−t and t ∈ [t, t] with 0 ≤ t < t < ∞ and d(v) =
1
v−v and
v ∈ [v, v] with 0 ≤ v < v <∞.
Under the log supermodularity of r(., .), the mapping function v(t) is
retrieved from the density functions as follows:
Z v
v
1
v − vdx =
Z t
t
1
t− t
dx
⇔
v
v − v =
t
t− t
⇔
v = v(t) = Λt
where Λ = v−v
t−t .
It immediately follows from this result that when both ability and tasks
follow the same distribution t = v and t = v, the mapping function in
equilibrium is the identity function. Using the parametric expressions of v(t)
and r(v, t) in equation 2, the log wage as a function of ability t is given by:
lnw(t) =
Z t
t
δΛtdt = lnw0 +
δΛ
2
¡
t2 − t2
¢
(3)
where lnw0 is a constant of integration.
3This example was not chosen for its realistic feature but rather for the sake of il-
lustration and comparability with other models. I chose uniform distributions for they
yield closed form solutions for all models depicted in this paper (except Teulings (1995)).
Using similar distributions of abilities across models has the advantage of keeping track
of the essential source of diﬀerences between the various models, i.e. the technology of
production.
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The wage function is identified up to a constant of integration. The model
could be closed using an exogenous reservation wage for workers, say ew, so
that lnw0 = ln ew guarantees full employment of workers.
Performing the change of variables t(lnw) and noting that dt = t
0(lnw)dw
w
,
the density distribution of wages in equilibrium is derived as:
l(w) =
1
δΛ
1
w
1
t(lnw)
where t(lnw) =
¡
2
δΛ
ln whw + t
2
¢1/2
.
3.2 Extension: Teulings 1995 and 2005
A particularly interesting extension of Sattinger (1975)’s model was devel-
oped in Teulings (1995). Teulings (1995) departs from Sattinger’s task as-
signment model by allowing the distribution of tasks to be endogenously
determined in equilibrium. This is of importance for recent empirical evi-
dence shown by Autor et al. (2006) and Goos and Manning (2007) indicate
a job polarization in the US and UK. Although one could simply change
exogenously the distribution of tasks in Sattinger’s model and reevaluate
the equilibrium assignment, endogenizing the distribution of tasks has the
advantage of taking into account the general equilibrium eﬀect of technical
change. In Teulings’s model, technological change aﬀecting the productivity
of worker-task pairs will not only aﬀect wages but also the demand for the
output of the various task. As the demand for the product of the various
tasks changes, the equilibrium distribution of tasks changes .
To endogenize d(v), consider that each task produces a commodity that
is traded in the good market at the price p(v). Each commodity is meant
for consumption purposes only. Workers/consumers have an identical homo-
thetic continuous CES utility function that captures their love for product
variety.
U =
µZ ∞
τ
q(v)fs(v)
−(η−1)dv
¶−1/(η−1)
(4)
where fs(v) is the density of commodity v (supplied in the good market)
produced, q(v) are exogenous weights for the various commodities and 1/η
is the elasticity of substitution between the various commodities.
9
Assuming free entry and perfect competition, firms pay workers their
marginal contribution to output. Defining r(v, t) the productivity of workers
with ability t at task v, this means that p(v)r(v, t)− w(v, t) = 0. Moreover,
since only the consumption of goods matters for workers, workers will choose
the task that maximizes their earnings. Earnings maximization yields the
additional condition ∂w(v,t)
∂v
= p0(v)r(v, t) + p(v)∂r(v,t)
∂v
= 0.
As in Sattinger (1975), if r(v, t) is log supermodular, workers with higher
ability have a comparative advantage in complex tasks. Assuming that work-
ers with diﬀerent abilities are perfect substitutes within jobs, equilibrium will
therefore be characterized by a strictly increasing mapping function t(v). The
density of jobs in equilibrium is derived from the density of ability and the
first derivative of the mapping function as d(v) = s(t(v))t0(v) and the density
of commodity of v produced is given by fs(v) = s(t(v))t0(v)r(v, t(v)).
Equilibrium in the goods market is achieved when consumers maximize
their utility as defined in equation 4 given the budget constraint:
M ≥
Z ∞
τ
fd(v)p(v)dv
where fd(v) is the density of commodity v demanded and M is disposable
income.
Utility maximization yields p(v) = Y ηg(v)fd(v)−η, which using the free
entry condition p(v)r(v, t) = w(t), the earnings maximization condition
p0(v)r(v, t) + p(v)∂r(v,t)
∂v
= 0, the equilibrium condition on the good mar-
ket fd(v) = fs(v) = f(v), diﬀerentiating with respect to v and substituting
s(t(v))t0(v)r(v, t(v)) for f(v) yields:
t
00
t0
+
∂r/∂t
r
+
s0t0
s
=
1− η
η
∂r/∂v
r
+
1
η
q0
q
(5)
This equation is a second order diﬀerential equation. Solving this equa-
tion gives the mapping function t(v) and hence the wage function. Closed
form solutions for this diﬀerential equation do not exist. However, Teulings
showed that with some additional assumptions on r(v, t), g(v) and s(t), a
closed form solution exists for the wage function conditional on the mapping
function v(t).
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In this model, the distribution of wages will be relatively skewed to the
right compared to the distribution of productivity, as in Sattinger (1975), as
the assignment is principally driven by comparative advantage.
Through simulations, Teulings (2005) was also able to show that the
wage distribution compresses as the mean ability increases in the economy.
In this model, the ease to substitute between workers depends on the ability
diﬀerential between workers. The larger the distance in ability between two
workers the harder it becomes to substitute one for another (see Teulings
(2005)).
Example 2. Assume4 that r(v, t) = exp(δvt) with δ > 0, g(v) = exp(ω +
(η − 1)λv) with η > 1, λ, ω ∈ R and s(t) is uniform on
£
t, t
¤
. Moreover,
assume v ∈ [v, v].
The mapping function is then the solution of:
v
00
(t) =
η − 1
η
(δt− λ) v0(t)2 + δv(t)v0(t)
To solve this second order diﬀerential equation requires two initial condi-
tions. These two initial conditions are: v(t) = v and v(t) = v.
The wage function conditional on the mapping function v(t) reads as:
w(t) = ω + η lnY − (η − 1) (δt− λ) v(t) + η ln v0(t)
4 Scale of operations
4.1 Sattinger 1979 and 1993
Sattinger (1979, 1993) generalizes Ricardo’s diﬀerential rents model to the
case of two heterogenous collaterals, i.e. workers and tasks. In his diﬀerential
rents model, tasks are associated with a unit of capital, a machine for the sake
of the argument. Each task refers to a diﬀerent machine and each machine
needs to be operated by fixed proportions of workers, i.e. one and only one
worker, to produce output. The level of output produced by a machine v
4Teulings (1995) derived the second order diﬀerential equation of v(t) and the wage
function using the same setting but assuming a normal distribution of abilities rather
than a uniform distribution.
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when operated by worker t is given by r(v, t). Assume that r has continuous
first and second order partial derivatives and that ∂r
∂v
, ∂r
∂t
> 0.
As in the comparative advantage model, the economy is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, large enough so that the density distribution of ma-
chines and workers can be assumed to be continuous on an interval. Without
loss of generality, let the support of t and v be [t, t] and [v, v] respectively.
Assume further that the measures of machines and workers are equal for
simplicity.
To derive the general equilibrium of this model, Sattinger (1979) assumes
that under the period considered, the distribution of machines is exogenous,
i.e. does not depend on wages. This assumption is equivalent to assuming
that firms first invest in capital before entering the labor market. This struc-
ture looks like the Putty-Clay structure. The hold-up problem inherent to
this structure is prevented by assuming perfect information.
With this exogeneity assumption, the general equilibrium of this model
is derived in three steps. In the first step, one makes a tentative assumption
about the assignment of workers to tasks in equilibrium. The second step
consists to derive the associated equilibrium wages for this assignment. Fi-
nally, in the third step, one checks whether the second order conditions for
equilibrium are satisfied by the equilibrium wages derived in step 2.
Step 1: Tentative tasks assignment
Consider the assignment of more productive workers to more productive
machines. This assignment results in a mapping function v that associates
to each value of ability t a single value of machine v ∈ [v, v], i.e. v = v(t)
with v0 > 0. The function v is monotonic, increasing on t ∈ [t, t] since abler
workers are assigned to more productive machines in equilibrium.
The density of workers’ ability can therefore directly be derived from the
density of machines by performing the transformation of variables v = v(t)
and noting that dv = v0(t)dt. This yields:Z v(t)
v(t)
d(v(t))v0(t)dt =
Z t
t
s(t)dt = 1 (6)
The density of individuals with ability t is therefore s(t) = d(v(t))v0(t).
This is a first order nonlinear nonautonomous diﬀerential equation.
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Step 2: Equilibrium wages and rents
The owner of machine v seeks to maximize the profits derived from its
machine. The profits from assigning a worker with ability t are r(v, t) −
w(t). The owner will therefore compare the productivity increase to the
wage increase associated to a worker with higher ability t. This yields the
following first order condition:
∂r(v, t)
∂t
= w0(t) (7)
Note that from the assumption that ∂r
∂t
> 0, we therefore have w0(t) > 0.
The equilibrium rents are obtained in a similar fashion by noting that
earnings are given by w(t) = r(v, t) − π(v). Earnings maximization leads
workers supplying ability t to compare the productivity increase to the rent
increase associated to a machine ranked to the left or the right of v. Hence,
the first order conditions to earnings maximization are given by:
∂r(v, t)
∂v
= π0(v) (8)
Equations 7 and 8 give respectively the wage diﬀerential at task v and
the rent diﬀerential at ability t. These wage and rent diﬀerentials do not
hold for values of t other than t = v−1(v) and therefore depend on the
equilibrium assignment. Evaluating the diﬀerential equation 7 for v = v(t)
and integrating over t yields the wage function. Evaluating the diﬀerential
equation 8 for t = v−1(v) and integrating over v yields the rents function.
Step 3: Second order conditions
The tentative assignment defined in step 1 is a valid one only when the
firms’ second order condition to profits maximization and the workers’ second
order conditions to earnings maximization, that is profits are concave in t
and earnings are concave in v, are satisfied. Put in equation, the second
order condition for profits maximization reads as:
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∙
∂2r(v, t)
∂t2
¸
v=v(t)
− w”(t)) < 0
⇔
−
∙
∂2r(v, t)
∂t∂v
v0
¸
v=v(t)
< 0
since w
00
(t) =
h
∂2r(v,t)
∂t2
i
v=v(t)
+
h
∂2r(v,t)
∂t∂v
v0(t)
i
v=v(t)
.
The second order conditions for earnings maximization read as:
∙
∂2r(v, t)
∂v2
¸
t=v−1(v)
− π”(v) < 0
⇔
−
∙
∂2r(v, t)
∂t∂v
1
v0
¸
t=v−1(v)
< 0
since π
00
(v) =
h
∂2r(v,t)
∂v2
i
t=v−1(v)
+
h
∂2r(v,t)
∂t∂v
1
v0
i
t=v−1(v)
.
Since v0 > 0 these second order conditions therefore imply that:h
∂2r(v,t)
∂t∂v
i
v=v(t)
> 0. Hence, as long as the cross derivative ∂
2r(v,t)
∂t∂v
is posi-
tive, that is as long as workers and machines characteristics are complements,
an assignment where abler workers get more productive machines, i.e.v0 > 0,
is valid.
Equilibrium pricing functions
Evaluating the diﬀerential equation 7 at v = v(t) and integrating over t
yields the wage function.
w(t) = w0 +
tZ
t
∙
∂r(v, x))
∂x
¸
v=v(x)
dx (9)
where w0 is a constant of integration.
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Similarly, evaluating the diﬀerential equation 8 at t = v−1(v) and inte-
grating over v yields the rent function as follows:
π(v) = π0 +
vZ
v
∙
∂rk(x, t)
∂x
¸
t=v−1(x)
dx (10)
where π0 is a constant of integration.
The wage and rent functions are identified up to constants of integration.
Following Sattinger (1979), the model is closed by specifying exogenous re-
serve prices for the marginal worker and machine. For the least able workers
to be indiﬀerent between being assigned to machine 1 or remaining unem-
ployed we need w(t) = w0 = ew > 0 where ew is the reservation wage. Firms
owing machines 0 will be indiﬀerent between employing the least able worker
or withholding the machine from the market if π(v) = π0 = r(v, t)− ew = eπ
where eπ is the reserve price for the owner of capital.
Once again, since w(t) is monotonic, its inverse t(w) is well defined. Per-
forming the change of variables t(w) and noting that dt = t0(w)dw, the
density distribution of wages in equilibrium is derived as:
l(w) = s(t(w))t0(w)
The diﬀerential rents model is a particularly interesting tool to investigate
the source of (rising) wage inequality. Recently, Gabaix and Landier (2008)
and Terviö (2008) have applied the model to the case of CEO pay. Both
studies show that CEO pay diﬀerentials are principally due to diﬀerences in
tasks performed by CEOs, i.e. the size of the firm managed by CEOs, and not
so much to skills diﬀerentials. Indeed, Terviö (2008) provides contrafactual
results showing that CEO pay diﬀerentials would be reduced considerably if
all CEO’s were running firms of similar size, whereas CEO pay diﬀerentials
would remained roughly constant if all firms were ran by CEO’s of same
ability. Moreover, looking at changes over time, both studies conclude that
the rise in CEO pay diﬀerentials over time are merely due to the rise in the
dispersion of firm-size.
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Example 3. To illustrate the model I propose a very simple example.5
Suppose r(v, t) = exp(δvt) with (a, b) ∈ (0, 1)2 and t ∈
£
t, t
¤
with 0 ≤ t < t <
∞ and d(v) = 1
v−v and v ∈ [v, v] with 0 ≤ v < v <∞. This functional form
satisfies: ∂
2r(v,t)
∂t∂v
=
¡
δ + δ2vt
¢
exp(δvt) > 0 so that an eﬃcient assignment
that assigns abler workers to more productive machines is valid. Note that
the function is log supermodular, so that abler workers have a comparative
advantage in more complex tasks. Suppose further that tasks and abilities
follow uniform distributions, so that s(t) = 1
t−t and d(v) =
1
v−v as in example
1.
The mapping function v(t) is retrieved from the density functions as fol-
lows:
Z v
v
1
v − vdx =
Z t
t
1
t− t
dx
⇔
v
v − v =
t
t− t
⇔
v = v(t) = Λt
where Λ = v−v
t−t .
Using the expressions of v(t) and r(v, t) in equations 9 and 10, the equi-
librium wage and rent functions read as:
w(t) = w0 +
tZ
t
δΛt exp(δΛt2)dx
= ew + 1
2
¡
exp(δΛt2)− exp(δΛt2)
¢
π(v) = π0 +
vZ
v
δ
Λ
v exp
µ
δ
Λ
v2
¶
dx
= eπ + 1
2
µ
exp
µ
δ
Λ
v2
¶
− exp
µ
δ
Λ
v2
¶¶
5Sattinger (1979) derived closed form solutions when both abilities and machines are
distributed according to distinct Pareto distributions.
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Performing the change of variables t(w) and noting that dt = t0(w)dw,
the density distribution of wages in equilibrium is derived as:
l(w) =
1
δΛ
1
2(w − ew) + exp(δΛt2) 1t(w)
where t(w) =
¡
1
δΛ
ln (2(w − ew) + exp(δΛt2))¢1/2.
4.2 Extension: Costrell and Loury 2004
The setting of the previous models emphasize a whole economy. This does
not mean that these assignment models could not be used to study assign-
ment within (large) firms. In the diﬀerential rents model presented above
for instance, tasks could simply refer to tasks within a single firm. This is
the approach taken in Costrell and Loury (2004). Costrell and Loury (2004)
focus on the division of labor within firm so that each firm owns a continuum
of machines, the same continuum for each firm. This contrasts to Sattinger’s
(1979) diﬀerential rents model where each firm owns a single machine. In this
setting it seems natural to close the model assuming a free entry condition
for firms. The free entry condition drives the firm’s total profits to zero so
that
R v
v
π(v)dv =
R t
t
(p(v(t))q(t)− w(t)) dt = 0. Assuming that the output
production is multiplicatively separable, i.e. r(v, t) = p(v)q(t), hence exclud-
ing the possibility for comparative advantage, and integrating equation 9 by
parts yields:
w(t) = w0 +
tZ
t
p(v(x))q0(x)dx
= w0 + p(v(t))q(t)−
tZ
t
v0(x)p0(v(x))q(x)dx (11)
Using the zero-profit condition, we find:
w0 =
1
t− t
tZ
t
yZ
t
v0(x)p0(v(x))q(x)dxdy
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Substituting into equation 11 obtains:
w(t) = p(v(t))q(t) +
1
t− t
tZ
t
⎛
⎝
yZ
t
v0(x)p0(v(x))q(x)dx
⎞
⎠ dy
−
tZ
t
v0(x)p0(v(x))q(x)dx
= p(v(t))q(t) +
1
t− t
tZ
t
yZ
t
v0(x)p0(v(x))q(x)dxdy (12)
The first term in equation 12 is the direct contribution of workers with
ability t to output. The second term is decreasing in ability t so that low-
wage workers earn more than their direct contribution to output whereas
high-wage workers earn less than their direct contribution to output. This
means that imposing a free entry condition leads to a wage profile that is
flatter than the profile of the direct contribution to output.
Example 4. To derive w0, using the free entry condition, as in Costrell
and Loury, r(v, t) needs to be multiplicatively separable. Consider r(v, t) =
p(v)q(t) = vatb where p(v) = va and q(t) = tb with (a, b) ∈ (0, 1)2 and t ∈ [t, t]
with 0 ≤ t < t < ∞ and d(v) = 1
v−v and v ∈ [v, v] with 0 ≤ v < v < ∞,
s(t) = 1
t−t and d(v) =
1
v−v . Note that Costrell and Loury (2004) consider the
case where b = 1. Since the density distributions are the same as in example
3, so is the mapping function in equilibrium: v = v(t) = Λt. The slope of
the wage function is given by bvatb−1 which evaluated at v(t) = Λt obtains
bΛata+b−1. Therefore, the wage function reads as:
w(t) = w0 +
bΛa
a+ b
¡
ta+b − ta+b
¢
(13)
where
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w0 =
1
t− t
tZ
t
yZ
t
aΛa
¡
ta+b−1 − ta+b
¢
dtdy
=
1
t− t
aΛa
a+ b
tZ
t
¡¡
ya+b − ta+b
¢
−
¡
ta+by − ta+b+1
¢¢
dy
=
1
t− t
aΛa
a+ b
⎛
⎝
1
1+a+b
³
t
a+b+1 − ta+b+1
´
−ta+b
¡
t− t
¢
− ta+b
2
³
t
2 − t2
´
+ ta+b+1
¡
t− t
¢
⎞
⎠
=
aΛa
a+ b
Ã
1
1 + a+ b
t
a+b+1 − ta+b+1
t− t −
ta+b
2
¡
t+ t
¢
− ta+b + ta+b+1
!
5 Comparative advantage or scale of opera-
tions?
The assignment of workers to tasks can be either governed by the structure
of comparative advantage or the scale of operations principle. Each princi-
ple, however, is characterized by a diﬀerent technology and hence, yields a
diﬀerent wage function in equilibrium. This holds even when the distribu-
tion of abilities and tasks and the production function of worker-task pairs
are identical. This fundamental diﬀerence is illustrated in example 1 and 3.
Given uniform distributions of abilities and tasks, equilibrium employment
is characterized by the same mapping function of abilities to tasks as shown
in Table 1. However, even assuming the same (exponential) production func-
tion of worker-task pairs in both models, the wage function as derived from
an assignment of workers to tasks governed by the comparative advantage
principle fundamentally diﬀers from the wage function derived from the scale
of operations principle.
How do the wage distributions between the two models diﬀer? More
specifically, does one model yield a larger wage inequality? The equilibrium
minimum wage for both models is by definition ew. The slopes of the respec-
tive wage functions, however, are ewδΛt exp( δΛ
2
(t2 − t2)) for the comparative
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advantage model and δΛt exp(δΛt2) for the scale of operations model. Tak-
ing the log of the ratio of these two expressions, the relative slope is equal
to ln ew − δΛ
2
t2 − δΛ
2
t2. This function is strictly decreasing in ability. Hence,
for a reservation wage larger than δΛ
2
(1 + t2), the slope of the comparative
advantage wage function will be larger than that of the scale of operations
wage function everywhere on the support [0, 1] for all δ > 0 and Λ > 0.
It follows directly from this result that wage inequality will be relatively
larger in the comparative advantage model than in the scale of operations
model as indicated in Panel a of Figure 1. Similarly, for a reservation wage
lower than unity, the slope of the comparative advantage wage function will
be smaller than that of the scale of operations wage function everywhere
on the support [0, 1] for all δ > 0 and Λ > 0. As a result, the distribu-
tion of wages will be relatively less unequal for the comparative advantage
model than for the scale of operations model. For intermediate cases, where
0 < t(w∗) =
¡
2
δΛ
ln ew − t2¢1/2 < 1, wage inequality will be larger at the bot-
tom of the distribution but lower at the top for the comparative advantage
model compared to the scale of operations model as indicated on Panel b of
Figure 1.
This simple example shows that although the distribution of tasks and
skills and the productivity of worker-task pairs is the same in both settings,
the wage structures need not be the same. Hence, the choice for one of the
other method will not be neutral to wage inequality. The main diﬀerence
between the two settings is about the factors of production. While labor is
the only factor of production in the comparative advantage model, in the
scale of operation model, both labor and capital are factors of production.
From a conceptual point of view at least, having both capital (machines) and
labor as factors of production seems to be more realistic. It appears therefore
judicious to apply the scale of operations model to data where capital is an
important factor in production, as Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö
(2008) have done in their studies of CEO pay, whereas the comparative ad-
vantage model would do just fine on data for which capital has a limit role
in production.
6 Technical change
Although Sattinger (1975) was not primarily interested in the eﬀect of tech-
nical change on wages, his model can be used to approach the question. It
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is straightforward from equation 2 that changes in the production function
r(v, t) will alter wage diﬀerentials and hence the curvature of the wage func-
tion and wage inequality. If technical change is skill-biased, that is if the
increase in r(v, t) over time is more pronounced for large t, then the wage
diﬀerential between any two ability levels t1 and t2 with t2 > t1 will increase
over time and so will wage inequality as can be seen from equation 2. In ex-
ample 1, skilled-biased technical change of this form will increase parameter
δ and hence, increase the slope of the wage function in equation 3. Rising
wage inequality will result.
In Teulings (1995), the eﬀect of changes in the production function on
wages is not as straightforward. As in Sattinger (1975), the direct eﬀect of
skill-biased technical change will be to increase wage diﬀerentials and hence
wage inequality. However, as can be seen from equation 5, skill-biased tech-
nical change will also alter the second term of both sides of the equation.
The impact will generally be diﬀerent on both sides since the second term
on the left hand side is ∂r/∂t
r
= ∂ ln r(v,t)
∂t
while the second term on the right
hand side is ∂r/∂v
r
= ∂ ln r(v,t)
∂v
. As a result, the shape of the mapping function
will change. Since wages depend on the mapping function, technical change
will also impact the wage function indirectly via the mapping function. The
direct impact of skill-biased technical change on wages might be partly oﬀ-set
by the induced changes in the mapping function. Note also that the change
in the mapping function will in turn change the density distribution of tasks
as d(v) = s(t(v))t0(v).
Costrell and Loury (2004), in their application of Sattinger’s (1979) dif-
ferential rents model to within firm hierarchical tasks assignment, also con-
sidered the impact of technical progress on the production function. The
type of production function they considered is multiplicatively separable, i.e.
r(v, t) = p(v)q(t), and q(t) = t. Hence, Costrell and Loury (2004) focuses on
technical changes that manifest themselves into changes in the function p(v)
over time leaving q(t) unaﬀected. This type of technical change improves
the performance of machines independently of the person that operates this
machine. If technical change is characterized by an increase in p(.) then the
wage diﬀerential between any two workers with respective abilities t1 and t2
with t2 > t1 widens over time. This result can be seen using equation 9 re-
placing r(v, t) by p(v)t. The wage diﬀerential between workers with abilities
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t1 and t2 with t2 > t1 is equal to w(t2)− w (t1) =
t2Z
t1
p(v(x))dx. Holding the
distribution of abilities and tasks constant over time, the mapping function
v(.) remains constant over time. Define k(s)(.) the function k(.) at time s
and assume that p(2)(.) > p(1)(.). Then we have:
w(2)(t2)− w(2) (t1) =
t2Z
t1
p(2)(v(x))dx
>
t2Z
t1
p(1)(v(x))dx = w(1)(t2)− w(1) (t1)
Hence, wage diﬀerentials at any ability levels will increase over time as
p(.) increases over time.
Although Costrell and Loury (2004) did not investigate the possibility
of changes in the function q(.), the consequences of an impact of technical
change on q(.) are straightforward. In particular, suppose that technical
change is skilled biased so that the productivity of abler workers increases
relatively more than that of less able workers. This means that q
0(2)(.) >
q
0(1)(.).6 Wage inequality will then increase everywhere on the support of
ability. Indeed we have:
w(2)(t2)− w(2) (t1) =
t2Z
t1
p(v(x))q0(2)(x)dx
>
t2Z
t1
p(v(x))q0(1)(x)dx = w(1)(t2)− w(1) (t1)
Although, the above results are fundamental to understand the impact of
technical change on the distribution of wages, the reviewed literature leaves
6Note that this condition implies q(2)(.) > q(1)(.). However, the condition q(2)(.) >
q(1)(.) is not suﬃcient to guarentee that technical change will increase wage inequality
everywhere as it does not guarentee that q0(2)(.) > q0(1)(.).
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important questions open. For instance, the question of what the impact of
changes in the distribution of tasks is on the distribution of wages? remains
unanswered. This question is highly relevant at sight of the recent empirical
evidence shown by Autor et al. (2006), Goos and Manning (2007) and Spitz-
Oener (2006) indicating that the distribution of tasks has polarized in the
90s in the US, the UK and Germany, at the same time that wage inequality
both within and between educational categories (college vs. high-school)
increased.
This question has received little attention in the literature, probably due
to the diﬃculty to derive generic results as changes in the distribution of
tasks aﬀect not only the equilibrium wage function but also the equilibrium
mapping function. To my knowledge, only Suen (2007) studied the impact of
changes in the distribution of tasks on wages. Using Sattinger’s (1979) dif-
ferential rents model with a multiplicatively separable production function
of the form r(v, t) = p(v)q(t), Suen (2007) investigated both the eﬀect of an
increase in the mean task holding other moments constant (first-order sto-
chastic dominance) and an increase in the dispersion of the task distribution
holding the mean task constant (second-order stochastic dominance) on the
distribution of wages. Suen (2007) showed that an increase in the mean task
will raise equilibrium wages of all workers but also raise wage diﬀerentials
everywhere on the support of abilities. Suen (2007) also showed that an in-
crease in the tasks dispersion will decrease the mean wage of workers, when
p(v) and q(t) are concave. Even more generic is Suen (2007)’s result that
the wage of all workers will decrease as the distribution of tasks becomes
more dispersed over time. However, the current results from the assignment
literature are silent about the impact of an increase in the dispersion of
tasks on wage inequality. Suen’s (2007) results make only predictions about
monotonic movements of wages for all workers but not about the dispersion
of wages.
7 Remaining research questions
Two-sided atomeless assignment models are very powerful to analyze (changes
in) the wage structure. However, this literature, although following a long
tradition, is rather under-documented, models remain quite restrictive and
applications too scarce. At least two important research questions are left
unanswered in the current literature.
23
1. A growing body of empirical research led by Heckman and Rubinstein
(2001) emphasizes the importance of both cognitive and noncognitive
skills in explaining earnings. In contrast, assignment models in the
literature assume that a single cardinal measure characterizes workers.
Can two-sided assignment models accommodate for multiple dimen-
sions of workers characteristics?
2. What is the relationship between aggregate output on the one hand and
the distribution of tasks and abilities in the economy and the product
of worker-task pairs on the other hand? In the literature about skill-
biased technological change and rising skill-premium, a standard as-
sumption is that aggregate production is of the Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) type and technical change is skilled-labor augment-
ing, leaving the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers unaﬀected.7 However, this last assumption seems to be at odds
with recent empirical evidence. Dupuy and Marey (2008) have shown
that the elasticity of substitution between high-school and college grad-
uates is not constant between 1964 and 2004 −it first decreased after
1978 and then increased after 1990− and Goldin and Katz (2007), using
longer time series, documented a change in the elasticity of substitution
between high-school dropouts and high-school graduates in 1949. This
raises the question of what does the CES assumption imply for the dis-
tribution of tasks or what does the skilled-labor augmenting technical
change imply for the evolution of the distribution of tasks over time?
Question 1 is addressed in Dupuy (2007a). Therein, I developed a general
equilibrium assignment model with endogenous human capital formation and
two dimensions of abilities. In this model educational choice together with
the multidimensionality of skills8 generates wage distributions by education
that, in general, will overlap. The general equilibrium feature of the model
enables us to analyze simultaneously the eﬀects of changes in the distribution
of tasks and/or abilities on i) educational choice, and hence human capital
formation, ii) the assignment of workers to tasks and iii) the structure of
7See Katz and Murphy (1992) and Acemoglu (2002) and references therein.
8Herewith, I use the term skills to refer to the transformation of abilities through
education/training. Skills are the outcome of the education production whereas abilities
are the input. In the model, workers are endowed with abilities of two types and self-select
education to transform their abilities into marketable skills.
24
wages. In the model, changes in the structure of wages arise from three
separately identified sources: 1) changes in the distribution of skills, due to
either improvements in the production of skills (schools quality improvement
for instance) or changes in the distribution of endowed abilities (genetic in-
heritance and favorable family backgrounds), 2) changes in the distribution
of jobs due to technological and organizational changes, and 3) changes in
the productivity of worker-job matches, due to technical or organizational
changes.
The first key feature of this model is that skills are endogenous and mul-
tidimensional. The endogeneity and multidimensionality of skills distinguish
the model developed in this paper from previous general equilibrium assign-
ment models in the literature that assume exogenous and unidimensional
skills. Not only the multidimensionality is in accordance with the impor-
tance of noncognitive skills in explaining earnings, but it also explains why
the wage distributions of workers with diﬀerent education overlap.
The second key feature that distinguishes the model from the existing
literature on assignment models is that two types of assignment occur. The
first type of assignment is workers’s educational self-selection. Workers are
initially endowed with abilities of two types and can choose out of two types
of education that each transforms abilities into marketable skills in diﬀerent
proportions. Educational self-selection endogenizes human capital formation.
Workers specialize and supply their skills of the type that maximizes their
earnings.
The second type of assignment is the assignment of workers to tasks. Each
task refers to a diﬀerent type of machine. To produce output, this machine
needs to be operated by one and only one worker. Although the various
machines can be operated by workers with diﬀerent types and levels of skills,
workers of diﬀerent types and levels of skills diﬀer in their productivity. For
instance, suppose that the production function of worker-task pairs is so that
i) workers of each skills type have a comparative advantage on a diﬀerent side
of the support of tasks, ii) within types of skills, more skilled workers have an
absolute advantage and iii) workers’ skills complement the characteristics of
machines in production. Then, following Ricardo’s principles of comparative
advantage and diﬀerential rents, equilibrium in this model is characterized
by two mapping functions, one for each type of skills supplied. The first
mapping function is decreasing and maps skills of the first type to tasks on
the left hand side of the support. The second mapping function is increasing
and maps skills of the other type to tasks on the right hand side of the
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support. These two mapping functions generate two wage functions, one for
each type of skills, that will in general overlap.
Dupuy (2007a) derives conditions under which technical change will lead
to within wage inequality but not to between wage inequality (this charac-
terizes the 70s in the US). A family of closed form solutions for the wage
functions is proposed. In this family, the production function of worker-
machine pairs is Cobb-Douglas, tasks are distributed according to a Beta
distribution and the mapping functions have a logistic form. For some pa-
rameter values, one can derive analytically the shape of the wage functions
in equilibrium and the distribution of wages within and between educational
groups.
Regarding question 2, a general drawback of using production functions
is that these functions lack micro-economic foundations that would enable us
to justify our parametrization. Another very promising application of assign-
ment models is in providing microeconomic foundations to aggregate produc-
tion functions to understand what assumptions we make when assuming a
CES production function with skill-labor augmenting technical change. In a
first attempt to address this question, Dupuy and Marey (2008) used Rosen’s
(1978) tasks assignment9 model to show that while Katz and Murphy (1992),
Acemoglu (2002) and the references therein, assume that sigma, i.e. the elas-
ticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, is constant over
time, they implicitly assume that technical change increases relative produc-
tivity of skilled workers proportionally in every tasks leaving comparative
advantage unaﬀected. The main problem with Rosen’s approach, however,
is that the shape of the production function is essentially driven by the rel-
ative (physical) productivity of skilled workers, which is rarely observed in
data and hence requires using macroeconomic time series of relative wages
and skill employment to look at changes in the elasticity of substitution (see
Dupuy and Marey (2008) and Goldin and Katz (2007)). To overcome this
issue, Dupuy (2007b), used a simplified version of the model developed in
Dupuy (2007a) so that the shape of the production function is now driven by
the distribution of tasks, which, using job titles for instance, could be proxied
in many data sets. The model shows that assuming a constant elasticity of
substitution over time is equivalent to assuming that the tasks distribution
9Rosen’s (1978) tasks assignment model does not qualify as a two-sided atomeless
assignment model for this model yields a partial equilibrium and workers within skills
groups are homogenous (discrete heterogeneity).
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is constant over time, hence no job polarization. This results is in sharp
contrast with the job polarization documented by Autor, Katz and Kearny
(2006), Goos and Manning (2007), Spitz-Oener (2006), which suggests the
use a CES production with variable elasticity of substitution over time to
predict the schedule of the college premium over time.
8 Summary
This paper surveyed the literature about two-sided atomeless assignment
models. Although in all models wage diﬀerentials arise from productivity
diﬀerentials, two groups of models can be distinguished. The comparative
advantage models consider that tasks can be performed by an indefinite num-
ber of workers but aggregate output is produced using fixed proportions of
the output at each task. In contrast, in the scale of operations models, each
task is associated with a machine that requires to be operated by a fixed
number of workers to produce output, but aggregate output is obtained by
summing up the output of each task. Both principles yield diﬀerent wage
functions in equilibrium even when the distribution of abilities and tasks
and the production technology are identical. For a large (small) enough
reservation wage, wage inequality will be larger (respectively smaller) in the
comparative advantage model everywhere on the support of abilities. In the
between, wage inequality will be larger at the bottom of the distribution but
lower at the top for the comparative advantage model compared to the scale
of operations model.
Assignment theory is arguably a very powerful tool to study (changes
in) the wage structure. Assignment models allow to diﬀerentiate between
changes coming from the distribution of skills (either school quality, environ-
mental factors helping fostering abilities or genetics), the distribution of tasks
(technical change, organizational change) or the productivity of worker-task
pairs (technical change). Those few studies that investigated the impact of
technical change on the wage structure using assignment models have shown
two important results:
i. Skilled-biased technical change captured by an increase in the produc-
tion function of worker-task pairs r(v, t) over time will increase wage
inequality over time. This result holds whether or not the production
function is multiplicatively separable (no comparative advantage).
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ii. When the production function of worker-task pairs is multiplicatively
separable, i.e. r(v, t) = p(v)q(t), this skilled-biased technical change
could manifest itself in the form of a rise in the performance of machines
at constant characteristic p(v) or in an increase in the performance
diﬀerential of workers at constant ability q0(t).
However, little is know about the impact changes in the distribution of
tasks on the structure of wages. Suen (2007) showed that an increase in the
mean task will raise equilibrium wages of all workers but also raise wage dif-
ferentials everywhere on the support of abilities and the wage of all workers
will decrease as the distribution of tasks becomes more dispersed over time.
However, Suen’s (2007) results make only predictions about monotonic move-
ments of wages for all workers but not about the dispersion of wages. The
assignment literature is silent about the impact of an increase in the disper-
sion of tasks on wage inequality.
In this paper I also argue that research in the assignment theory literature
should focus on:
1. Looking at the impact of an increase in the dispersion of tasks on wage
inequality, building on Suen (2007)’s results,
2. Developing assignment models with multidimensional skills −to cope
with the recent literature on the importance of non cognitive skills in
wage formation−, endogenize the distribution of skills −to pin down
the source of changes in the distribution of skills over time (genetics,
environmental factors helping to foster abilities and quality of school)
and hence changes in the wage structure−, building on Dupuy (2007a),
3. By their very microeconomic nature, the models could help linking
macroeconomic concepts to microeconomic forces and hence provide a
mean to evaluate how stringent macroeconomic assumptions are. For
instance, Dupuy (2007b) shows how macroeconomic production func-
tion can be built from microeconomic forces like the distribution of
tasks or skills.
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Table 1: Comparative advantage or scale of operations?
Density Productivity Mapping Wage Function
Workers Tasks
s(t) d(v) r(v, t) v(t) w(t)
Comparative Advantage 1
t−t
1
v−v exp(δvt) Λt ew exp( δΛ2 (t2 − t2))
Scale of Operations 1
t−t
1
v−v exp(δvt) Λt ew + 12 (exp(δΛt2)− exp(δΛt2))
Inverse wage function Wage density
t(w) l(w) = s(t(w))t0(w)
Comparative Advantage
¡
2
δΛ
ln whw + t
2
¢1/2 1
δΛ
1
w
1
t(w)
Scale of Operations
¡
1
δΛ
ln (2(w − ew) + exp(δΛt2))¢1/2 1
δΛ
1
2(w−hw)+exp(δΛt2)
1
t(w)
where Λ = v−v
t−t
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Figure 1: Wage as a function of skills under comparative advantage (full line)
and scale of operations (dashed line) for two diﬀerent technology parameter
δ. In both panels skills and tasks are uniformally distributed between 0 and
1 so that Λ = 1 and the reservation wage is ew = 1.5. Panel a was generated
with technology δ = 1 while panel b was generated with technology δ = 3.
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